Throughout history, every advance in encryption has been defeated by advances in hacking with severe consequences. Quantum cryptography [1] holds the promise to end this battle by offering unconditional security [2] [3] [4] when ideal single-photon sources and detectors are employed.
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The gap between ideal devices and realistic setups has been the root of various security loopholes [13, 14] , which have become the targets of many attacks [5] [6] [7] [8] . Tremendous efforts have been made towards loophole-free QKD with practical devices [15, 16] . However, the question of whether security loopholes will ever be exhausted and closed still remains.
Here, we report a QKD experiment, that closes the loopholes in both source and detection and hence can achieve unconditionally secure communication. On one hand, ideal single photon sources are replaced with weak coherent states by varying mean photon intensities -the decoy-state method [10] [11] [12] . On the other hand, by implementing the MDI-QKD protocol [9] , all the detection side channels are removed from our system.
In a conventional QKD system, such as prepare-and-measure protocols, the sender, Alice, sends quantum states encoded with key information (qubits) to the receiver, Bob, who then measures them, as shown in Fig 1a. A malicious eavesdropper, Eve, may intercept and manipulate the quantum signals traveling in the channel, and forward tampered signals to Bob. In a typical security proof of QKD [13] , one assumes that Eve performs manipulation on the Hilbert space of qubits. Since the photons have degrees of freedom other than the one used for key information encoding, Eve might take advantage of the side-channel information.
For example, when an efficiency mismatch exists between detectors [5] , Eve can steal some information of the key by shifting the arrival times of the quantum signals at Bob, which is called time-shift attack [6] . More attacks can be launched if other degrees of freedom are considered: for instance, the detector blinding attack [7, 8] exploits the detector's after-gate pulses and dead time.
MDI-QKD [9, 17] protocols close all loopholes on detection at once. In fact, the detectors in a MDI-QKD setup can even be assumed to be in Eve's possession. As shown in Certain post-selected coincidence events are used as the raw key. As discussed in Ref. [9] , even if Eve controls the measurement site, she cannot gain any information on the final key without being noticed. The security of MDI-QKD is based on the time-reversed version of entanglement-based QKD protocols [18, 19] , which is naturally immune to any attacks on detection.
In our experimental realization, we implement the time-bin phase-encoding MDI-QKD A critical aspect to this experiment is the indistinguishability of the signal pulses generated by the two independent laser sources, mainly in three dimensions: spectrum, timing and polarization. Any mismatch in these dimensions would introduce errors in the X-basis. Firstly, the wavelength difference between Alice's and Bob's pulses need to be small compared to the bandwidth of the laser pulse. In our system, we utilize a 1 MHz shared time reference from a field-programmable gate array to modulate two independent distributed feedback (DFB) laser diodes to produce Alice's and Bob's signal pulses. The pulse width is about 2 ns and its wavelength centers at 1550.200 nm with a full width at half maximum (FWHM) of about 10 pm. By adjusting the temperature control precisely, the laser's central wavelength can be set to a precision of about 0.1 pm, which is small enough to keep the error rate low. Secondly, the temporal modes of Alice's and Bob's pulses should be overlapped precisely. We use an optical delay (OD) in Alice's station to adjust the pulse timing. The resolution of the OD is better than 10 ps and the time jitter of the laser pulses is also around 10 ps, which is small compared to the pulse width of 2 ns. Thirdly, the polarization of the quantum signals may rotate during the channel transmission due to the fiber birefringence.
In front of the interference beam splitter, we insert a polarization controller and a polarizer in each arm to make the polarization indistinguishable.
The relative phase between the two arms of the Mach-Zehnder (MZ) interferometer may fluctuate with temperature and stress, which introduces further errors in the X-basis. We use an additional fiber between Alice and Bob as for feedback to stabilize the interferometer phases. By sending light from another laser light from Alice's MZ interferometer through Bob's MZ interferometer, we monitor the power at one of the outputs of Bob's interferometer with a single-photon InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiode (APD). The feedback is implemented by using a phase shifter inside Bob's MZ interferometer, as shown in Fig. 2c .
The performance of QKD systems is determined to a great extent by the quality of single-photon detectors, mainly in two aspects -efficiency and noise. In comparison to the conventional QKD, MDI-QKD requires two-fold coincidence detection instead of single-fold click. Then, the channel transmittance, and hence the key rate, has quadratic dependence on the detector efficiency. Thus, high-efficiency single-photon detectors are required for MDI-QKD. Under room temperature, an up-conversion single-photon detector can provide highest quantum efficiency in telecom band. However, its dark count used to be more than 100 kHz, which limits its application in QKD. Here, we utilize long-wave pump technology [20] to suppress detector dark counts by two orders of magnitude. In our setup, the signal photon is mixed with a strong pump at 1940 nm in a wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) coupler and is sent to a fibre-pigtailed periodically poled lithium niobate (PPLN) waveguide, where the pump and signal interact via the sum-frequency generation process, as shown in Fig. 2b Bob respectively use average photon number µ and ν, the key rate is given by the standard decoy-state formula [9, 11] ,
where I ec is the cost of error correction, depending on the overall gain (Q µν ) and error rate (E µν ); H(e) = −e log 2 (e) − (1 − e) log 2 (1 − e) is the binary Shannon entropy function; Q 11 (e 11 ) is the gain (phase error rate) when both sources generate single-photon states.
In the experiment, we run our MDI-QKD system for 59.5 hours to collect raw data. Fig. 3a shows the original sifted key bits and error rates in the Z-basis and the X-basis with different average photon numbers. From Fig. 3a , one can see that the error rates in the Z-basis, E µν , are less than 0.5%, when the intensities, µ and ν, are not 0. With the error rates (of decoy and signal states) in the X-basis, we can place an upper bound on the phase error rate in the Z-basis, i.e. e 11 , which is 24.6% [21] . Then, we evaluate the final secure key rate by Eq. (1), as shown in Fig. 3b , from which we can see that the main reductions of the key rate come from the non-single-photon components and privacy amplification. The privacy amplification part is largely affected by the relatively small data size. Here, we have not considered the key cost in authentication and efficiency of privacy amplification, which has been shown to be small, typically, less than 1000 bits, in a practical system [22] .
Finally, Alice transmits a 24192-bit image to Bob via the one-time-pad protocol, using the secure key generated from our MDI-QKD system, shown in Fig. 4 . The resulting encrypted message looks like white noise to anyone without a copy of the key, but Bob can decode it by carrying out a bitwise exclusive OR operation with his copy of the key.
We remark that the internal modulation of decoy/signal states guarantees our system to be secure against the unambiguous-state-discrimination attack [23] . All the components in our experiment can find immediate application in fiber based quantum technology, optical time domain reflectometer, photon-counting lidar and etc. Meanwhile, the technology of interfering two independent lasers, developed in our experiment, is also an essential building block of a quantum repeater [24] in global quantum communication. Furthermore, the MDI-QKD scheme can be extended into a quantum network with a star-like structure [17] , in which users only need photon sources but not detection systems. The expensive parts of the system, detectors, are only required at the service center, i.e., the measurement site.
The transmission distance and secure key rate can be significantly improved by increasing the repetition rate, which is mainly limited by the detector timing jitter. Our up-conversion detector can be run under a clock rate of 2 GHz [25] , with which the transmission distance can go beyond 250 km and the secure key rate can be more than 1 kbits per second at 100 km.
Institute of Quantum Science & Technology Co., Ltd.
Appendix A: Key rate
In the data post-processing, we essentially follow the numerical method presented in Ref.
[26] to extract final secure keys from the raw data. When the decoy-state protocol is used, normally, the final key is only extracted from the signal states. In our case, we extract secure keys from all decoy/signal states as long as the contribution is positive. In our experiment, we choose 4 different intensities for signal and decoy states for each arm. Thus, there are 16 combinations of detection events and the overall key rate can be given by,
where
is the overall gain (quantum bit error rate, QBER) when Alice and Bob, respectively, use expected photon numbers of µ k and ν l ; I
is the cost of error correction with f as its efficiency; H(e) = −e log 2 (e) − (1 − e) log 2 (1 − e) is the binary Shannon entropy
is the rate for successful partial Bell-state measurement (BSM) when both sources generate single-photon states. We remark that the phase error rate of single-photon states, e 11 , are assumed to be the same for all cases of signal and decoy states [11] .
The final key is generated from the data obtained in Z-basis, so all the terms in Eq. (A1)
should be measured/inferred in Z-basis. The phase error rate, e 11 , in Z-basis, which cannot be measured directly, is inferred by the bit error rate in X-basis, estimated by decoy states.
obtain a successful partial BSM, is given by
where Y 11 is the yield of single-photon states, that is, the probability to get a valid BSM in the measurement site conditioned on the case when both Alice and Bob send out singlephoton states. Similar to phase error rate e 11 , the yield Y 11 is assumed to be the same for all signal and decoy states [11] . The key point of the parameter estimation in the postprocessing is to estimate the privacy amplification term of Eq. (A1), which depends two variables, Y 11 and e 11 .
Four coherent states with different intensities are used on both Alice's and Bob's sides, {µ 0 , µ 1 , µ 2 , µ 3 } and {ν 0 , ν 1 , ν 2 , ν 3 }, respectively. The mathematical question can be stated as follows [27] ,
subject to, In order to minimize the privacy amplification term, Eq. (B2), we calculate the lower bound of Y 11 and the upper bound of e 11 , which can be solved by linear programming. Since the coefficients of Y ij and e ij decrease exponentially with growth of i and j, this optimization problem can be solved efficiently by discarding the high order terms in the constraints of Eq. (B3). From our numerical evaluation, we found that the effect of the terms of i, j ≥ 7 on the parameter estimation is negligible. Apparently, it would be more efficient if we solve the minimization problem, Eq. (B2), directly, instead of bounding Y 11 and e 11 separately.
Here, we will leave it for future study.
Moreover, when the statistical fluctuations are taken into consideration, the equality constraints shown in Eq. (B3) become inequalities. Similarly, the optimization problem can
